Abstract-In order to deal with the problems that defense measures are not been take into accounted and the return of the unit cost in network security analysis, a active defense strategies selection method for network mixed malicious actions was proposed. Firstly, a network security mixed game model was presented combined with the actual situation that the utility of the players are not equal. Premise in the classification of the mixed confront scenes, the utility function was proposed with the return of the unit cost. Then, the network mixed defense strategy selection algorithm was given and the best strategy for defender was obtained by analyzing the Nash equilibrium of the game model. Finally, a representative example is given to illustrate the efficacy and feasibility of the method on malicious actions prediction and active defense strategy selection.
INTRODUCTION
With the development of the network, the concept of network security has been studied from passive defense to active defense for early prediction. The defense effect depends on the actions of the malicious behavior sponsors to be taken. In order to get the best defense effect with limited resources, it is important to select a reasonable defense strategy.
Mutual influence of the network strategies is a behavioral interactions, game theory can be used to analysis this problem. In [1] , the author introduced game theory to heterogeneous complex military systems and describes how to use game theory to analyze network security event. In [2] , the author gives a measure of analyze network security event based on game theory, the confrontation between the attacker and the defender was described as a double game problem. In [3] - [4] , an active defense method of network security was proposed based on dynamic game theory. In [5] , the author proposed the concept of stochastic petri net combined stochastic game with petri net. But the problem of revenue quantify has not considered in all the literatures above. In [6] , the inherent harm of malicious behavior was described by criticality and lethality. In [7] , the author firstly proposed a cost-sensitive model as the basis of response decision. In [8] , a network game model was proposed and confrontation strategies were classified. The literatures above assume that the malicious sponsor can launch independent malicious behavior, but not consider security strategy under mixed malicious actions.
In response to these problems, a network defense strategy for mixed malicious actions was proposed in this paper. Firstly, modeling a network security mixed game model and classifying the game scene, then analyzing the utility function. By solving Non-zero-sum game, the optimal defense strategy is obtained and malicious action is predicted.
II. NETWORK SECURITY GAME MODEL
Network Security mixed Game Model (NSMG) is represented by a four-tuple, , , , , , There are many different definitions of utility functions. In [8] , the utility function is defined as the difference between the benefits and costs. In order to reflect the effect of unit cost, the utility function is defined as (benefit-cost)/ cost in this paper. Suppose the players take independent action ( , ) ij ad , the corresponding expression for utility functions is: 
Cost is the cost of independent defense action j d which mainly refers to the consumption of resources to perform preventive measures ( PC ) and the negative influence to the system ( NI ) ; There are no relationship between negative influence and malicious action, negative influence is only with defense action.
B. The utility of mixed action
Assuming that all the independent actions are independent of each other, the game can be divided into three scenes: 
Through collecting the information of cost and resource about the players, it can analyze whether the player have enough resource to take some actions, so as to simplify the state space, which is more consistent with the actual situation. Assume that the largest resources players have are , ad SSrespectively, the cost to take mixed action for both players of the game required to meet formula (9): 
The cost of both players can be measured by investment of technology, money and time et al, and the reward can be measured from material and psychological. In this paper, cost and reward of players are abstracted as money.
C. Nash Equilibrium
If players of the game take mixed strategy   [9] , the author has proved that any game of finite strategy has one mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium at least. Because of the numbers of actions in NSMG are limited, correspondingly the strategy game is limited. So the NSMG has one mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium at least.
When reach the Nash Equilibrium, it can't get more profits from change strategy unilaterally.
IV. MIXED STRATEGY GAME SOLUTION
It has been proved that NSMG has a non-empty set of optimal strategy for each player. Combining reward quantization method, we obtain the optimal defense strategy selection algorithm:
Input: Network Security Game Model 
Step6. Analysis of the Nash Equilibrium and predict the malicious action which is most likely happen, then determine the active defense strategy.
V. CASE STUDY
Use the following network to illustrate NSMG . The topology of the network is show in Fig. 1 . The goal of malicious behavior sponsors is to intrude the database server. The database server has opened the service of e-mail and FTP. The rule of firewall is that the host in LAN1 only with root privilege to Ftp service and the host in LAN2 only with Table I and Table II . The information of opposite action is shown in Table III . In order to simplify the analysis, assume that the assert value of all the hosts is (3000，4000，2000), resource of players are 2000. In the condition of infinite resource, 1  2  3  4  5  1  2  1 3  1  4  2  3 ( , , , , ,( , ),( , ),( , ),( , ),
The utility matrixs of two players are shown in Fig. 2 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the network security is abstracted as noncooperate game model combined with the actual situation of network. In the view of network security attribute, describe utility function with the ratio of reward and cost. The optimal defense strategy selection algorithm is given. The result of the experiment shows that NSMG is efficacy in 339 malicious action prediction and active defense strategy selection.
